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THESE PARKS ARE OUR PARKS:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC
PARKS IN NEW YORK CITY AND THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE’S PROTECTIONS
Thomas Honan*
INTRODUCTION
The Great GoogaMooga, advertised as “an amusement park of Food,
Drink, & Music” was a music, artisan food, and drink festival in Prospect
Park.1 GoogaMooga lasted two days during the summer of 2012 and three
days during the summer 2013,2 and demonstrates the negative impact of
private use on public space.3 The Prospect Park Alliance, a non-profit
organization founded to raise private funds to supplement the financing of
Prospect Park,4 and Superfly, a privately owned music festival company,
organized GoogaMooga.5 The festival was strategically placed in
*

J.D. Candidate, Class of 2015, City University of New York School of Law.
About Great Googamooga, http://brooklyn.googamooga.com/(last visited Apr. 26,
2014).
2
Florence Fabricant, The GoogaMooga Festival Will Return in May, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 2013, http://dinersjournal.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/the-googamooga-festivalwill-return-in-may/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
3
Lauren Evens, Photos: After GoogaMoogApocalypse, A Scorched Earth That Will
Take Months To Recover, THE GOTHAMIST (May 22, 2013),
http://gothamist.com/2013/05/22/great_googa_mooga.php#photo-1.
4
The Prospect Park Alliance is an organization that partners with the City of New
York for managing and maintaining the park. What We Do, THE PROSPECT PARK
ALLIANCE, http://www.prospectpark.org/learn-more/what-we-do/ (last visited Feb. 2,
2015).
5
Michael Powell, A Curious Cost/Benefit Analysis of a Park Fund-Raiser, N.Y. TIMES
(May 17, 2013), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/17/a-curious-costbenefitanalysis-of-a-park-fund-raiser/.
1
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Nethermead Meadow, a lovely tree-lined meadow located in the center of
the park.6 Nethermead Meadow is traditionally used by the public for dog
walking, tossing a football, and gathering with friends for a picnic, the
leisure activities one would expect to take place in a park meadow. Over the
three-day event, Nethermead Meadows played host to approximately
120,000 people, and accommodated approximately 75 restaurant stands, 65
drink stations, and two stages where 20 bands performed.7 As one Prospect
Park local aptly put it, “It’s like bringing a boombox into a library – it
doesn’t belong there.”8
The festival was intended as a fund-raising opportunity for the park.9
The idea was that the event would raise sufficient funds to provide a benefit
to all the park users.10 Instead, the festival resulted in the destruction of the
Nethermead Meadow and prevented the public from its use for a month
after it ended.11 Additionally, the festival was promoted as a community
event.12 The Great GoogaMooga website explains: “And that’s why The
Great GoogaMooga is more than a festival. It’s a community brought
together by a shared passion.”13 However, many of the communities
surrounding the park were unable to attend because of the high admission
cost of $79.50,14 and the Nethermead Meadow prevented non-ticket holders
from access by way of a fence.15 The most disturbing aspect of The Great
GoogaMooga experience is that in consideration for allowing the park’s
use, The Prospect Park Alliance received a mere $75,000.16 Essentially, the
6

Neathermead Meadow,
http://web.archive.org/web/20140404034922/http://www.prospectpark.org/nethermead
(last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
7
Jess Wisloski, The Great GoogaMooga, a Bonnaroo For Brooklyn Foodies, Reveals
Lineup, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 12, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/24/the-great-googamooga-a-bonnaroo-brooklynlineup-music_n_1450543.html.
8
Powell, supra note 6.
9
Why the Great GoogaMooga, Prospect Park Alliance,
http://web.archive.org/web/20140310224724/http://www.prospectpark.org/about/communit
y-news-updates-post/why-the-great-googamooga?lpid=1538183 (last visited Apr. 25,
2014).
10
Id.
11
Powell, supra note 6.
12
About Great Googamooga,
http://web.archive.org/web/20131019205106/http://brooklyn.googamooga.com/about/ (last
visited Apr. 26, 2014).
13
Id.
14
Rachel Tepper, GoogaMooga 2013: Festival Wises Up, Promises To Fix First-Year
Mess, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 27, 2013, 9:15 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/26/googamooga-2013_n_2958510.html.
15
Powell, supra note 6.
16
Id.
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festival was intended to provide a substantial benefit to the public and
promoted itself as a community event, when in reality the surrounding
community lost part of its park for a month.
The GoogaMooga experience illustrates the effects privatization can
have on the public’s use of its parks. Public parks are areas of land that are
dedicated to be used for the public interest.17 Since the 1970s, there has
been a steady trend toward the privatization of public parks in New York
City.18 Over the past ten years, new models of privatization have emerged,
and, more than ever, the public is in danger of losing out on its use of
parks.19 This trend corresponds with a substantial decrease in state and city
funding for public parks.20 Since 2008, the City has slashed its overall
maintenance and operation of parks budget by 21%.21
Accompanying the decrease of state and city financing, the
beautification and expansion of the number of public parks in New York
City have increased.22 Under Mayors Rudy Giuliani and Michael
Bloomberg, three new parks were created (High Line, Brooklyn Bridge
Park, and The Hudson River Park).23 The decrease in state and city
financing coupled with an increase in public parkland have forced parks to
seek out new structures of operating, managing, and financing, which often
result in development or promotional use of parkland in a way that excludes
or limits the public’s access.24 Additionally, the mechanisms in which these
17

795 Fifth Ave Corp v. City of New York, 40 Misc. 2d 183, 183 (Sup. Ct. NY Cnty.

1963).
18

See TOM ANGOTTI, NEW YORK FOR SALE: COMMUNITY PLANNING CONFRONTS
GLOBAL REAL ESTATE 75-78 (The MIT Press 2011) (describing the NYC fiscal crisis of
the 1970s, and the divestment in public resources including public space). See John L.
Crompton, Programs that Work: Forces Underlying the Emergence of Privatization in
Parks and Recreation, 16 J. PARK AND RECREATION ADMIN. 88, 90 (1998) (discussing the
emergence of alternative models of managing parks).
19
Michael F. Murray, Private Management of Public Spaces: Nonprofit Organizations
and Urban Parks, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 190 (2010); Douglas Martin, Clown
Prince of the Emerald Empire, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/19/nyregion/clown-prince-of-the-emerald-empire.html
(discussing Henry J. Stern and his reliance on free labor and private money for park
maintenance).
20
Christopher Rizzo, Five Innovative Ideas for Funding Parks and Open Space, 13
N.Y. ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE REPORT 1, 2 (Jul.-Aug. 2012).
21
Id.
22
Id.; See Frank Bruni, Our Newly Lush Life, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 14, 2012) (discussing
parkland expansion under the Bloomberg Administration); Martin, supra note 20
(discussing parkland expansion under the Giuliani Administration).
23
Rizzo, supra note 21 at 3.
24
See Cathryn Swan, Pushing Privatized “Partnership” agenda at New York City’s
Public Parks –Part 3, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 19, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/cathryn-swan/pushing-privatized-partnership-
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structures are forming eliminate the parks’ accountability to the public.25
Historically, the common law public trust doctrine in New York
provided protections for the public’s interest in its parks.26 It limited
development through public officials’ accountability to state residents,27 and
sought to maintain parkland for the purpose of public use and enjoyment of
traditional park purposes.28 The primary principle of the public trust
doctrine is that the state of New York holds the park in trust while the city
manages and maintains it for the public interest.29 To put this differently,
the state and city are responsible for assuring that parks remain adequately
maintained and are managed to remain accessible to its citizens.30 If the city
of New York wishes to sell, lease, or use public parkland for “non-park”
purposes, it is required to receive legislative approval.31 The development
of New York’s public trust doctrine has concentrated on distinguishing park
purposes from non-park purposes, allowing park purposes to evade
legislative approval.32
The public trust doctrine lacks proper definitions, is antiquated, and
does not adequately address the current issues facing public park use and
development today.33 The creation of new privatized structures to operate
public parks and subvert the public trust doctrine, result in greater use of
agenda_b_3769191.html.
25
Id.
26
795 Fifth Ave. Corp., supra note 20; Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 477 (1969)
(discussing three restrictions on governmental authority imposed by the public trust
doctrine including the holding of the property by the government for the public purpose
and for use by the general public; see Brooklyn Parks Com’rs v. Armstrong, 6 Hand 234,
244 (1871).
27
Williams v. Gallatin, 229 N.Y. 248, 253 (1920) (“…no objects, however
worthy…which have no connection with park purposes, should be permitted to encroach
upon it without legislative authority plainly conferred…”); Cyane Gresham, Improving
Public Trust Protections on Municipal Parkland in New York, 13 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J.
259, 284-86 (2002) (discussing the local community’s ability to prevent legislation if
legislative approval is required).
28
Williams, 229 N.Y. 248 at 253; Cyane Gresham, Improving Public Trust Protections
on Municipal Parkland in New York, 13 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 259, 284-86 (2002).
29
SFX Entertainment, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 124059/01, 2002 Sup. Ct. WL
1363372, at *8 (N.Y. Cnty. 2002); Friends of Van Cortland Park v. City of N.Y., 95
N.Y.2d 623 (“dedicated park areas in New York are impressed with a public trust for the
benefit of the people of the State. Their ‘use for other than park purposes, either for a
period of years or permanently, requires the direct and specific approval of the State
Legislature, plainly conferred.”).
30
See SFX Entertainment, Inc., 2002 WL 1363372 at *8.
31
Id.
32
See Williams v. Gallatin, 229 N.Y. 248 (1920).
33
Cyane Gresham, Improving Public Trust Protections on Municipal Parkland in New
York, 13 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 259, 276-77, 282-83 (2002).
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park space for private, corporate interests, and limits the accessibility of the
general public. Courts need to account for the recent neo-liberal adaptations
through expansion of the doctrine’s protections,34 and the city’s residents
need more responsibility in the decision making process of park
development.35
This Comment advocates for two major changes. First, it argues that
courts need to more heavily consider the public’s access to public parkland,
in the face of major development, which excludes a large portion of the
public from the use and enjoyment of parkland, in its analysis of what is a
park/non-park purpose. Second, the approval of park purpose developments
on parkland should give the affected community more responsibility in the
decision-making process.36 It will include two case studies to examine the
trend toward the evisceration of the public trust doctrine, and the failure of
private-public partnerships to develop parkland. These case studies will
look at the role the municipality plays in the formation and operation of the
degree to which they are accountable to the public, how their exclusivity
prevents access to much of the public, and to what extent they are limited
[or not] by the public trust doctrine.
This Comment will begin in section I with a discussion of the
transformation in financing of public parks in New York City, from
publicly financed to reliance on private and corporate support to maintain
its public parks. Section II examines The Brooklyn Bridge Park (“BBP”)
and The Hudson River Park (“HRP”) as case studies, illustrative of how the
new managing and financing structures subvert the public trust doctrine and
the failures of private-public partnerships in their management of public
34

This Comment defines neo-liberalism as a political and economic paradigm that
seeks to combine political freedom with the concept of free market capitalism and the
privatization of the public domain. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM
2 (Oxford University Press 2005) (“Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of
political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”).
35
Cathryn Swan, Union Square FOR Sale?… Judge rules NYC Parks Department and
local BID can Proceed with Renovation that Will Likely Include Privatized Restaurant,
WASHINGTON SQUARE PARK BLOG (Apr. 2 2009),
http://washingtonsquareparkblog.com/2009/04/01/union-square-for-sale-judge-rules-infavor-of-nyc-saying-historic-public-space-can-be-privatized/.
36
The concept of relying more heavily on the municipal citizenry to participate in
decision-making stems from the broader idea of “deliberative democracy.” Deliberative
democracy is a participatory governance model that promotes the removal of decision
making from the politicians and placed in the “public sphere.” This theory suggests that
deliberative decision-making will ensure government is run by the public standards.
Patricia E. Salkin and Charles Gottlieb, Engaging Deliberative Democracy at the
Grassroots: The Effects of the Fiscal Crisis in New York at the Local Government Level, 39
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 727, 756-58 (Mar. 2012).
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parks. Section III returns to the common law public trust doctrine,
examining the original purposes behind its formation, its current status, and
how it falls short of that protective purpose vis-à-vis the rise of newly
privatized public parks. Section IV will suggest proposals for the courts’
future analysis of park/non-park purposes. Section V will discuss the
connection between this analysis and the disparity of maintenance of parks
in wealthy and low-income neighborhoods as a conclusion.
I. BACKGROUND
“In Real Estate 101, we learn that the three universal principles of real estate for
people who own property are location, location, location.”
– Tom Angotti

In New York City, land is scarce and valuable. Alone, the land on
Manhattan is worth billions, and the metropolitan region, trillions.37 While
land value is based on many different interplaying factors, one major
determinant of valued land is whether it is next to a park, on a waterway, or
even better, both.38 For example, Central Park adds an estimated $17.7
billion in value to its surrounding buildings.39 Additionally, a 2002 survey
by Ernst and Young indicates an 8%-30% increase in property value near a
park.40 For example, the Highline, a private/public venture and relatively
new park that is built atop an abandoned elevated railway, has helped to
promote some of the most rapid gentrification in the City’s recent history.41
The Highline has been attributed to increasing the property values in the
neighborhood by 103 percent.42
New York City urban planning is heavily influenced by the real estate
industry.43 Therefore, there is a major financial incentive for New York City
to expand its park space.44 Since 2002, three major parks have opened: the
37

Angotti, supra note 19, at 38.
Felix Simon, Why Privately-Financed Public Parks are a Bad Idea, REUTERS (Nov.
22, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2013/11/21/why-privately-financedpublic-parks-are-a-bad-idea/.
39
Rizzo, supra note 21, at 2.
40
Id. at 1-2; see New Yorkers for Parks & Ernst & Young, How Smart Parks
Investment Pays its Way, 1 (2003).
41
Jeremiah Moss, Disney World on the Hudson, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2012, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/22/opinion/in-the-shadows-of-the-high-line.html.
42
New York City Economic Development Corporation, Economic Snapshot: a
Summary of New York City’s Economy (Aug. 2011), available at
https://www.nycedc.com/sites/default/files/files/economicsnapshot/EconomicSnapshotAugust2011_0.pdf.
43
Angotti, supra note 19, at 46.
44
Rizzo, supra note 21, at 2.
38
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High Line, Brooklyn Bridge Park, and The Hudson River Park.45 In contrast
to this expansion of public park space, New York City underwent a major
divestment in its parks department and public parkland.46 Now, it relies
more and more on quasi public-private structures to maintain its parkland.47
This divestment did not happen overnight, and is part of a much larger
trend in New York City of substituting the use of public monies for public
spaces with a reliance on private entrepreneurship and philanthropic
donations to support its public spaces.48 The 1970s marked New York
City’s fiscal crisis,49 the closest New York City has come to bankruptcy.
New York City’s bankruptcy could have had far reaching repercussions for
urban municipalities across the Northeast.50 While the Federal Government
under Gerald Ford essentially told New York to “drop dead,”51 the state
eventually prevented the world’s largest city from declaring bankruptcy.52
The typical discussions at the time simplified the complex causes of the
fiscal crisis, and were generally framed within the rhetoric of too much
short-term borrowing and debt load, loss of revenues, and the inability of
New York City to manage its budget.53 By simplifying the causes, the
response was also simplistic; New York City must slash expenditures,
contract out government responsibilities to the private sector that could
more efficiently and responsibly manage its budget, and rely on
development and entrepreneurship to replace municipal expenditure cuts.54
Essentially, the fiscal crisis resulted in a lack of trust in the city to manage
its finances, which has continued until today.55
In the wake of the fiscal crisis and the shift from New Deal toward neoliberal politics, a major divestment in city resources took place.56 Arguably,
45

Id. at 3.
Id.
47
See Swan, supra note 25.
48
See Angotti, supra note 19, at 77 (discussing the dramatic effect of divestment from
city resources on public parks and open space, and the private models that have filled the
financing gap); Murray, supra note 20, at 190.
49
See WILLIAM K. TABB, THE LONG DEFAULT: NEW YORK CITY AND THE URBAN
FISCAL CRISIS 1 (1982).
50
Id. (explaining that the fall of New York City could have been the beginning of the
fall of the urban cities all across the northeast).
51
Angotti, supra note 19, at 76.
52
Patricia E. Salkin & Charles Gottlieb, Engaging Deliberative Democracy at the
Grassroots: The Effects of the Fiscal Crisis in New York at the Local Government Level, 39
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 727, 731 (2012) (discussing the fiscal crisis of 1970 and its results on
the federal, state, and municipal governance roles).
53
Tabb, supra note 50, at 2-3 (discussing the ways that the fiscal crisis was viewed by
many within both the federal and state governments).
54
Id.
55
Angotti, supra note 19, at 77.
56
Id. at 12, 76 (discussing the deregulation and support structures of the federal
46
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the most drastic cuts were from the Parks Department and management of
public spaces.57 Public spaces are an easy target for municipal cuts, because
the Parks Department receives little support from the state and federal
government and is therefore easy to cut from the city’s discretionary
budgets.58 Since the 1990s, the Parks Department’s full time employees
were cut by 50%, and its overall budget by 11%.59 Between 2008 and 2013,
New York City further cut its maintenance and operation budgets by 21%.60
Even more noteworthy, is that although New York City’s parks and
playgrounds occupy 14% of the city’s land, the 2010 budget allocated a
mere .5% of its annual budget for parks.61
Coupled with this major divestment of municipal funds from public
spaces has been a movement toward creating quasi private-public
arrangements for the maintenance and operation of public parks.62 The first
of these structures was The Central Park Conservancy, created in 1980.63
Upon its creation, The Conservancy immediately stepped in and raised
approximately $180 million for capital projects and restoration of the
park.64 There are certainly issues with the Conservancy model, because
much of that $180 million is tax deductible and therefore the government
still fronts much of the bill.65
Since the establishment of the Central Park Conservancy, public parks
in New York City have followed suit. The Prospect Park Alliance was
established in 1987,66 and The Battery Park Conservancy in 1994.67 As this
government beginning in the 1970’s, and the way these policies “diluted” the role of social
movements in American cities).
57
See John L. Crompton, Forces Underlying the Emergence of Privatization in Parks
and Recreation, 16 J. OF PARK AND RECREATION 88, 90 (discussing the emergence of new
privatized models of services after the 1970s).
58
Id. at 174.
59
Anemona Hartocollis, Parks in a Tangle, a Plan to Tame, N.Y. TIMES (May 8,
2005), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/08/nyregion/thecity/08colm.html?pagewanted=print&_r
=0.
60
Rizzo, supra note 21, at 2.
61
New Yorkers for Parks, Supporting Our Parks: A Guide to Alternative Revenue
Strategies, 3 (2006) available at http://www.ny4p.org/research/other-reports/oraltrevenue10.pdf.
62
Angotti, supra note 19, at 77.
63
Interview by Amy Eddings with Karen Putnam, President, Central Park
Conservancy (Feb. 20, 1998), available at
http://www.loe.org/shows/segments.html?programID=98-P13-00008&segmentID=1.
64
Id.
65
See Felix Simon, The Problematic Charitable-Donation Tax Deduction, REUTERS
(Nov. 28, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/11/28/the-problematiccharitable-donation-tax-deduction/.
66
The Alliance, THE PROSPECT PARK ALLIANCE, http://www.prospectpark.org/learn-
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shift toward privatization evolves, parks seek out models that will allow for
more development in order to raise funds, and fewer limitations on the
decision to develop the parks, which by its nature means side-stepping the
Public Trust Doctrine.68
II. CASE STUDIES, THE BROOKLYN BRIDGE PARK AND THE HUDSON
RIVER PARK: THE SUBVERSION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
AND THE FAILURES OF SELF-SUSTAINABLE PRIVATE/PUBLIC
MODELS
Reserving public parks for the availability and use of the general public
is a major principle underlying the public trust doctrine. In New York a
public park cannot be alienated or used for a non-park purpose without the
approval of the legislature and a “home rule” request.69 The following
section develops case studies of two NYC parks to demonstrate the effects
of commercial use on parks, including the lack of accountability to the
public, the exclusion of certain vulnerable populations from any calculus in
the parks decisions to develop, how private/public partnerships are failing,
and how these new structures are able to avoid the public trust doctrine’s
limitations.
A. The Brooklyn Bridge Park
This first section considers how a properly dedicated park can
circumvent the public trust doctrine and its protections. The Brooklyn
Bridge Park is an example of the shift toward privatization of public park
space and the control that private entities have over the parkland.70
The history of the Brooklyn Bridge Park is unique and provides insight
into the intentions behind the creation of the park. In the 1980s the Port
Authority wanted to sell its abandoned piers to private developers for the
creation of luxury apartment buildings.71 The result would have meant a
more/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
67
About the Battery Conservancy, THE BATTERY CONSERVANCY,
http://www.thebattery.org/the-conservancy/ (last visited May. 7, 2014).
68
Rizzo, supra note 21.
69
N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 40; Uniform Land Use Review Procedure § 2-01;
Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,
68, MICH. L. REV. 471, 476-78 (1969) (discussing restrictions on state authority).
70
Alex Ulam, Our Parks Are Not for Sale: From the Gold Coast of New York to the
Venice Biennale, DISSENT MAGAZINE, Winter 2013, available at
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/our-parks-are-not-for-sale-from-the-gold-coast-ofnew-york-to-the-venice-biennale.
71
Angotti, supra note 19, at 174.
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blocked waterfront view for the rest of Brooklyn.72 The Brooklyn Heights
Association and a number of affected community groups, neighborhood
associations, and civic groups rallied in opposition to this sale.73 The
proposal was defeated, and followed by a long process of creating a park,
accessible to all, on the property.74
The Brooklyn Bridge Park Coalition (“the Coalition”) engaged in a tenplus year process to formulate a plan for the Brooklyn Bridge Park.75 In
1992, the Coalition issued a statement of “13 guiding principles” for the
future development of a plan,76 and subsequently began planning to
implement the project.77 In 1998 the Downtown Waterfront Local
Development Corporation (“DWLDC”) was created for the purpose of
planning the park.78 The result of the DWLDC, public forums, and
thousands of affected community members’ input was the issuance of the
“Illustrative Master Plan”,79 and the signing of a Memorandum of
Understanding (“MOU”) between the Governor and the Mayor (“the
Parties”).80 The MOU lays out the parties’ intentions for the creation of the
Brooklyn Bridge Park, and reads in pertinent part:
1. The State of New York and the City of New York share a
common determination to preserve and provide public access to
waterfront areas in order to allow for recreation and public
enjoyment and to enhance economic development
2. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has agreed to
transfer parcels of real property for dedication to the Project,
including Piers 1-5 adjacent to the East River on Brooklyn
Waterfront for purposes of creating a public park.
3. The Parties agree that the Project will be guided by the provisions
contained in the Illustrative Master Plan subject to any refinements
thereto arising from the completion of the planning and
environmental review processes for the Project.
4. No less than eighty (80) percent of the Project will be reserved as
72

Id.
Id.
74
Brief for Petitioner at 9-10, Brooklyn Bridge Park Legal Defense Fund v. NY State
Urban Development Corporation, 50 A.D.3d 1029 (2008) (No. 2006-11988).
75
Angotti, supra note 19, at 175.
76
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 75, at 9.
77
Id. at 9-10
78
Brief for Respondents, at 8-9, Brooklyn Bridge Park Legal Defense Fund v. NY
State Urban Development Corporation, 50 A.D.3d 1029 (2008) (No. 2006-11988).
79
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 75, at 10.
80
Brief for Respondents, supra note 79, at 10.
73
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open space and will be dedicated as parkland that is subject to the
protective provisions of State and City law pertaining to park
properties.
5. Upon completion of construction of the Project or phases thereof,
the state-owned areas designated as open space under the General
Project Plan shall be transferred to the jurisdiction of state parks and
shall be afforded the protections of state law relating to the nonalienation of state park lands.81

In addition to these agreements above, the MOU created a new
subsidiary of the Empire State Development Corporation called the
Brooklyn Bridge Park Development Corporation (“BBPDC”) that was
responsible for implementing the project and creating a General Project
Plan in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding and the
Illustrative Master Plan.82
The BBRDC completed the General Project Plan (“GPP”), but ignored
many of the community efforts to put the Brooklyn Bridge Park into
action.83 It eviscerated the original purpose of creating the Brooklyn Bridge
Park—to prevent high-rise luxury apartment buildings that would obstruct
views of the East River.84 In the GPP, two major developments were
proposed on piers 1 and 6.85 On Pier 1 a hotel and residential development
were proposed to replace two existing warehouses.86 Two buildings would
be built, one 55 feet high and another 100 feet high.87 The second proposal
on pier 6 called for either one residential building 315 feet high, or
alternatively, two buildings 215 feet high.88 Additionally, an existing
building on pier 6 would be transformed into another residential building of
54 feet.89 Lastly, an existing manufacturing building would be converted to
a residential building of 169 feet.90 All in all, the proposed GPP would
create a hotel and either 4 or 5 residential buildings on land that was defined
as a public park in the MOU.91
This long history was the backdrop for a lawsuit decided in 2006 that is
81

Memorandum of Understanding, Brooklyn Bridge Park Defense Fund v. NY State
Urban Development Corp., 2006 WL 6589451 (N.Y.Sup. 2006) (No. 2006-14764).
82
Brief for Respondent, supra note 79, at 10.
83
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 75, at 12-13.
84
Id. at 7.
85
Brooklyn Legal Defense Fund v. NY State Urban Development Corp., 14 Misc.3d
515, 518 (Sup. Ct. 2006).
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 75, at 7-8.
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fundamental to understanding the changing circumstances and limitations of
the public trust doctrine.92 The court, in Brooklyn Bridge Park Legal
Defense Fund, Inc. v. New York State Urban Development Corp. found that
the MOU between the City and State did not define the actual parameters of
the parkland, but rather the GPP determined what was considered dedicated
parkland.93 Additionally, the court interpreted the MOU to allow for
approximately 80 percent of the park to be used as parkland, and the MOU
to permit any use on the remaining 20 percent, regardless of what that use
is.94 The court held that “[w]hile this doctrine continues unabated, beyond
peradventure, the parcels designated for residential/commercial
development herein are not parkland, have never been parkland and were
never designated to become parkland. As such, they fall entirely outside the
scope of our Public Trust Doctrine.”95 This holding allows for parks to be
dedicated through an MOU and then for the GPP to determine which areas
of the park are for parkland and which areas can be used for commercial
and residential uses.96
The MOU above clearly dedicates piers 1-5 as a public park.97
However, the GPP placed a hotel and residential building in the park, which
is a direct violation of the public trust doctrine.98 What is more concerning
is the possibility that this holding would allow for unlimited commercial
and residential development in public parks dedicated in MOUs.99 In its
reply brief, the petitioners caution, “For this court to ignore this threat to the
Public Trust Doctrine is to allow this case to be a precedent for unlimited
commercial and industrial development in or adjacent to public parks,”100
for example, placing residential apartments on the edges, entrances, and
possibly within the park.101 The court disagreed with this argument, finding
that the GPP redefined what is dedicated parkland, and that the planned

92

Brooklyn Legal Defense Fund v. NY State Urban Development Corp. 14 Misc. 3d
515 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 2006).
93
Id. (interpreting the MOU to defer to the GPP when designating the area to be
dedicated as parkland).
94
Brooklyn Legal Defense Fund, 14 Misc. 3d at 523 (discussing the GPP proposal for
approximately 90 percent of the project to remain open space, which is in agreement with
the MOU).
95
Id. at 524.
96
Brooklyn Legal Defense Fund, 14 Misc. 3d at 523.
97
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 75, at 10.
98
See id. at 24-28 (arguing that the private development takes place “close” to the
edges of the park and “within” the proposed park).
99
See Rizzo, supra note 21, at 5.
100
Reply Brief For Petitioners at 8, Brooklyn Bridge Park Legal Defense Fund v. N.Y.
Urban Development Corp., 50 A.D.3d 1029 (2008) (No. 20006-11988).
101
Id.
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location of the residential and hotel buildings are not within parkland.102
The analysis of the case was flawed. The MOU should not be permitted
to act as a dedication device only to be thwarted by a GPP.103 The GPP
should guide the planning, but those guidelines should be restricted by the
original MOU.104 This case was affirmed by the Appellate Division 2nd
Department,105 but never reached the Court of Appeals. In the event another
private/public venture attempts to utilize a similar dedication model, the
Court of Appeals will have an opportunity to strengthen the public trust
doctrine and find that when a park is dedicated through an MOU the
parameters of the parkland cannot be subsequently changed in the GPP, if
they have already been specified.
B. The Hudson River Park
The Hudson River Park (“HRP”), more than anything, exemplifies the
failure of private parks.106 The NY State Legislature adopted the Hudson
River Park Act (“HRPA”) on September 8, 1998.107 The HRPA’s purpose
was to effectuate a self-sustainable public park.108 This meant the
employees, operations, and maintenance of the park were to be
independently supported by income generated within the park.109
Commercial tenants’ rent, fees from park-operated concession revenues,
and independent grants and private donations were intended to secure
sufficient income for the park’s operation.110
The HRP was the first park that envisioned complete self-sustainability
through commercial use, and many viewed the quasi-public/private
partnership envisioned in the HRPA as the future of New York City
parkland.111 The Senate’s statement in support of the act described the HRP
102

Brooklyn Bridge Park Legal Defense Fund v. NY State Urban Development Corp.,
50 A.D.3d 1029, 1031 (2d Dep’t 2008).
103
See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 75, at 8.
104
Amicus Curiae Brief of Sierra Club at 5-6, Brooklyn Bridge Legal Defense Fund v.
N.Y. Urban Development Corp., 50 A.D.3d 1019 (2008) (No. 20006-11988), 2007 WL
5232222 (arguing that the MOU agreed that the GPP was to be guided by the Illustrative
Master Plan, which did not intend to allow “specialized” commercial uses).
105
Brooklyn Legal Defense Fund v. NY State Urban Development Corp., 50 A.D.3d
1029 (2d dep’t 2008), aff’g 14 Misc. 3d 515 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2006).
106
Trouble in Parkland, Op-Ed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/09/opinion/opinionspecial/09CI_hudsonpark04.html.
107
Hudson River Park Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 1642 (1998).
108
Hudson River Park Trust, About Us, http://www.hudsonriverpark.org/about-us/hrpt
(last visited March 3, 2015).
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Ulam, supra note 71 (describing the HRP as the first park to be financed through
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as “the most significant public space to be created in Manhattan since the
creation of Central Park.”112
The HRPA’s intention was clear, to develop a self-sustainable public
park, with the interest of serving all New Yorkers:
The planning and development of the Hudson River Park as
a public park is a matter of state concern and in the interest
of the people of the state. It will enhance the ability of New
Yorkers to enjoy the Hudson river, one of the state’s great
natural resources; protect the Hudson river, including its
role as an aquatic habitat; promote health, safety and
welfare of the people of the state; increase the quality of
life in the adjoining community and the state as a whole;
help alleviate the blighted, unhealthy, unsanitary and
dangerous conditions that characterize much of the area;
and boost tourism and stimulate the economy . . . . It is in
the public interest to encourage park uses and allow limited
park/commercial uses in the Hudson river park . . . . [It is
intended that] the costs of the operation and maintenance of
the park be paid by revenues generated within the Hudson
river park and that those revenues be used only for park
purposes.113
There are two important features of this statement of intent. First, it
makes it clear that the HRP is created as a public park and for the public.114
Second, it suggests that the operation and maintenance of the park are to be
paid through private commercial uses.115 Additionally, the HRPA created
the “Hudson River Park Trust” (“the Trust”), a public benefit corporation to
oversee the development plan, design, construction, and future operation
and maintenance of the park.116
As mentioned above, some of the park’s revenue has come through
commercial use of the space.117 However, the planning and operation of the
park have been remarkably underfunded.118 In 2005 the Park only generated
the model of complete reliance on the private sector).
112
Senate Statement of Support, dated June 19, 1998, Bill Jacket, S.B. 7845, Ch. 592.
113
Hudson River Park Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 1642 (McKinney 1998).
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.; Press Release, Governor George Pataki, Governor Pataki Names Appointments
To Hudson River Park Trust (Mar. 4, 1999).
117
Hudson River Park Trust, HUDSON RIVER PARK,
http://www.hudsonriverpark.org/about-us/hrpt (last visited May 15, 2014).
118
Hudson River Park Trust, 2004 Annual Financing Plans – Capital Commitments by
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approximately $47,646,270 in operating revenue (after depreciation and
operating expenses were subtracted).119 In 2013, this number only slightly
increased to $34,169, 250.120 The initial investment of approximately $200
million was not enough to adequately complete the park, nor was the
operating revenue enough to properly maintain the parks.121 By 2005 most
of the initial investment was drained and the HRP only halfway finished.122
Currently, thirty percent of the park remains uncompleted,123 and the Trust
is estimated to have a $7-plus million deficit.124 These facts that point to the
park’s lack of revenue, current deficit, and inability of the Trust to finish the
park show how the park was underfinanced from the start, and the risks
involved in a quasi-public/private structure.125
The legislature recently amended the HRPA to encourage transfer of
development rights (“TDR”)126 to generate more revenue.127 However, if
the TRD program does not adequately finance the current and future
operations of the park, a question remains as to how the park will be
funded. The most likely response is longer leases, more commercial
development, and possibly residential buildings.128 The HRPA identifies
Source, available at
http://www.hudsonriverpark.org/assets/content/general/2004AnnualReport.pdf.
119
HUDSON RIVER PARK TRUST, FINANCIAL STATEMENT (2005),available
at http://www.hudsonriverpark.org/assets/content/general/FinancialStatements2005.pdf.
120
Id.
121
Op-Ed, Trouble in Parkland, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/09/opinion/opinionspecial/09CI_hudsonpark04.html?_r=
0 (last visited Mar. 3, 2015).
122
Id.
123
Paula A. Ullman, Let’s embrace this key moment for Hudson River Park, THE
VILLAGER, Nov. 14, 2013.
124
Laura Kusisto, Hudson River Park Plan Is Questioned, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL (July 22, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323848804578605843365387704.
125
See Ulam, supra note 71.
126
Transfer of development rights (TDR) programs allow a property owner to sell their
development rights to other owners. This is generally allowed because the municipality
wants to preserve areas in a specific way, but does not want the property owner to be
financially burdened. Rizzo, supra note 21, at 6.
127
See Lisa W. Foderaro, Law Says Hudson River Park Is Allowed to Sell Air Rights,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2013 (“Wednesday night, Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo signed into law
the bill that will let Hudson River Park…sell development rights in order to collect muchneeded revenue.”).
128
In the past the Hudson River Park has made exceptions regarding longer leases. An
exception was made for Chelsea Piers, and the lease for Pier 57 has been extended to allow
for 49 years. Lincoln Anderson, With long lease at Pier 40, would Related re-emerge?,
THE VILLAGER, June 2009, available at
http://thevillager.com/villager_319/withlongerlease.html. Additionally, prior to its
amendment to allow the sale of air rights, discussions arose allowing housing on Pier 40. In
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and defines “permitted uses” to mean, “park use” and “park/commercial
use”, and “prohibited uses”.129 Therefore, any “permitted use” has been
approved by the legislature.130 Although the HRPA provides for a public
hearing prior to any “proposed” significant action, it is unclear what action
will receive public comments.131 Additionally, the definitions in the act do
not take into consideration accessibility, meaning the Trust could
potentially approve a festival or enter into a lease with a luxury restaurant
without any public accountability.132 Alternatively, a public hearing prior to
any Trust action would give all community members the option of
expressing their views.
The Trust is required to deliver its annual financing plan and any
amendments to the general project plan to a number of local officials.133 An
option that would likely yield a result that benefits the public good is to
allow for a deliberative democracy process in the financing plan.134 A
deliberative democracy structure would promote civic engagement and
provide an opportunity for all community members to deliberate about
future park services, allowing all sides to better understand what park uses
benefit all.135
III. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE AS
IT PERTAINS TO PUBLIC PARKS IN NEW YORK
This section examines the history of the public trust doctrine and its
competing views. It will discuss the how the public trust doctrine’s
definitions of park/non-park purposes have included analysis of public
access to parks, but how the focus has shifted toward relying primarily on
proper functions of parks. This section seeks to demonstrate the necessity of
more emphasis on access to parks in the court’s analysis, especially in the
midst of the changing structures of parks to a private/public model and their
reliance on entrepreneurism on public space.

the News: A Possible Hudson River Park Solution, TRIBECA CITIZEN, June 20, 2013,
available at http://tribecacitizen.com/2013/06/20/in-the-news-a-possible-hudson-riverpark-solution/.
129
Hudson River Park Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 1643 (McKinney 1998).
130
Id.
131
Hudson River Park Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 1647 (McKinney 1998).
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Salkin & Gottlieb, supra note 53, at 756-58 (discussing the benefits of deliberative
democracy).
135
Id.
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A. Doctrinal History
The origins of the public trust doctrine in the U.S. are grounded in
preventing private ownership of property from disrupting the public
interest.136 Under this doctrine, certain lands are held by the state in trust for
the public’s interest.137 Generally, the justification behind this principle has
been to “encourage and direct economic growth”, by allowing for the
navigable waterways to remain under the ownership of the state in which it
resides.138 Additionally, the public-trust doctrine has been a state’s issue,
and therefore differs from state to state.139 Professor Joseph Sax in his
influential article lays out three general limitations the doctrine has on state
governmental authority: 1) the property must be used for the public purpose
and available for use by the general public; 2) the property may not be sold;
and 3) the property should be limited to traditional or related uses.140 This
section will examine the public trust doctrine in New York as it pertains to
parkland and how its analysis has concentrated mostly on preserving the
latter two of Sax’s principles to the detriment of the first.
In New York, the public trust doctrine includes protection of public
parks from alienation and use for non-park purposes,141 reflecting the
principle that state parkland is held by the state, in trust for the
public.142 Any alienation of parkland or use for non-park purposes requires
approval by the legislature.143 The policy behind requiring legislative
approval for non-park use or alienation is that there is more public
accountability in that process, which includes a “Home Rule Request” and
the ULURP process.144
136

Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894) (discussing the origins of the concept of
jus privatum and its subjugation to jus publicum: “though in point of property it may be a
private man’s freehold, yet it is charged with a public interest of the people, which may not
be prejudiced or damnified.”); Martin v. Wadell’s Lessee 41 U.S. 367, 383 (1842).
137
See Shively, 152 U.S. at 13.
138
Michael Seth Benn, Towards Environmental Entrepreneurship: Restoring The
Public Trust Doctrine in New York, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 203, 209 (2006) (quoting MOLLY
SELVIN, THIS TENDER AND DELICATE BUSINESS: THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY 1789-1920, at 11-12 (Harold Hyman & Stuart
Bruchey eds.1987)).
139
Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 476-78 (1969) (discussing restrictions on state
authority).
140
Id. at 477.
141
Friends of Van Cortland Park v. City of N.Y., 95 N.Y.2d 623, 630 (2001).
142
See id.
143
Id. at 630-31.
144
Gresham, supra note 34, at 284-85, 290-91. Prior to any legislative act that
alienates parkland or allows for the non-park use of parkland a “home rule request” must
be sent after approval by 2/3 of the local legislature. N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law § 40.
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This general rule is complex, and has been defined and redefined in over
150 years of state court decisions.145 Additionally, the doctrine has been
critiqued as inconsistent, lacking clear definitions or guidance for parks, and
allowing for too much discretion and flexibility for judges in the
determinations of when parkland should be protected by the doctrine.146 A
look at the leading cases that have defined the doctrine offers an
understanding of the doctrine’s benefits and limitations.
The landmark Court of Appeals case from 1871, Brooklyn Park
Commissioner v. Armstrong, initially articulated the public trust doctrine’s
protections against alienation of parkland.147 In Armstrong, the city of
Brooklyn acquired a large tract of land through eminent domain.148 In an
action by the legislature in the act of 1861 the municipality was authorized
to take lands for a public place, for public use, and for a public
park.149 Additionally, upon the fulfillment of the act of 1861 the acquired
lands were vested “forever in the city”.150 The act of 1861 authorized and
issued bonds to raise the necessary funds for the land.151 In subsequent
legislation, the act of 1870 sought to sell a parcel of the parkland to the
defendant, who refused to take title, claiming, “the city had not the power to
convey a clear title in fee, free from all encumbrances.” The case was
commenced as a test case.152
The court in Armstrong held that the land in question could not be sold,
because of prior bond obligations and contracts with those
bondholders.153 However, the case also provides the basis, in its discussion,
for the public trust doctrine as it pertains to parkland.154 The court explained
that dedicated parkland might only be sold through proper legislative
Prior to a change in land use, which includes the alienation of parkland or use for a nonpark purpose a ULURP application must be submitted to the City of New York Department
of City Planning. The ULURP process includes direct recommendations from the
community board after a public hearing. However, the recommendation from the
community is not dispositive and cannot halt the process. Uniform Land Use Review
Procedure § 2-01. Additionally, any actions to “approve, fund or directly undertake an
action which may affect the environment are subject to review under the State
Environmental Quality Review Act. Division of Environmental Permits New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation: The SEQR Handbook 12 (2010).
145
Rizzo, supra note 21, at 3.
146
See Gresham, supra note 34, at 276.
147
The Brooklyn Park Commissioners v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234, 243 (1871).
148
Id. at 235.
149
Id. at 239.
150
Id. at 241.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 238.
153
Id. at 248.
154
Id. at 243.
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approval.155 The act of 1870 demonstrated proper legislative approval;
however, the obligations to bondholders ultimately prevented the sale.156
Fifty years later the Court of Appeals extended the public trust
doctrine’s protections of parkland in Williams v. Gallatin, where it
prohibited the use of parkland for a non-park purpose without legislative
approval.157 In Williams, the New York City Park Commissioner entered
into a ten-year lease with the Safety Institute of America (“The Institute”)
for the use of the Arsenal Building located in Central Park.158 The Institute
sought to provide studies and promote methods of safety and sanitation
through its use of the property.159 The lease required that the Arsenal
Building remain open to the public and free of charge five days of the
week.160 However, it reserved two days a week when the building was
closed to the public.161 Additionally, the lease prohibited commercial
transactions for gainful purposes without any rent charges.162 The Institute
agreed to make no less than $50,000 in repairs, alterations, and
improvements to the Arsenal Building in exchange for its use.163 The
plaintiff claimed that the construction and alteration of the Arsenal Building
would damage and injure Central Park for the use and enjoyment of the
New York City public.164
The court held that the lease did not establish a park purpose, and
therefore the Park’s Commissioner must seek legislative approval before the
lease could be valid.165 The court’s discussion provides guidance on how
park purposes “should be viewed”:
A park is a pleasure ground set apart for recreation of the public, to
promote its health and enjoyment. It need not, and should not, be a
mere field or open space, but no objects, however worthy, such as
courthouses and schoolhouses, which have no connection with park
purposes, should be permitted to encroach upon it without
legislative authority plainly conferred, even when the dedication to
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Id.
Id. at 248.
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See Williams v. Gallatin, 229 N.Y. 248, 253 (1920).
158
Id. at 250.
159
Id. at 251.
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Id.
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Williams v. Gallatin, 108 Misc. 187, 191 (Sup. Ct. NY. Cnty. 1919).
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Id. at 190.
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Id.
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Id. at 187.
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Gallatin, 229 N.Y. at 254 (finding the purposes of the Safety Institute not related to
the purposes of a park).
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park purposes is made by the public itself and the strict construction
for the private grant is not insisted upon.166

Moreover, the court provided examples of what it defined as “pleasure
grounds.” It includes, “[m]onuments and buildings of architectural
pretension which attract the eye and divert the mind of the visitor, floral and
horticultural displays, zoological gardens, playing grounds, and even
restaurant and rest houses…”167 The court’s holding therefore turned on the
mission of the Institute, and concluded that its mission—to promote the
understanding of safety and sanitation—does not advance this court’s
definition of park purposes as pleasure grounds.168
The court’s decision has been influential in guiding future courts’
analyses of park and non-park purposes.169 Cyane Gresham in her
article, Improving Public Trust Protections of Municipal Parkland in New
York, criticizes the Williams’ court for its failure to provide an adequate
guide for future courts, given its failure to clearly define what purposes are
park or non-park.170 Gresham acknowledges that the Williams court lists
specific examples of park purposes; her critique is that the court does not
provide any concrete test or theoretical base for its distinctions between the
park and non-park purposes.171 This critique is accurate. The lack of a test
or theoretical base for future courts leaves too much discretion for judges to
determine arbitrarily what a park’s purpose is.172
A major problem with the definition provided by the Williams court is
its failure to recognize how its definition would allow for park development
without considering that a pleasure ground could easily exclude much of the
public if the project was unaffordable.173 For example, under the Williams
analysis, a museum, zoo, or restaurant that charged high entrance rates
could be constructed in a public park, which would fit the definition of a
“pleasure ground”, but prevent access to much of the public, because it
could be unaffordable.174 The result would be a public park that charges an
166

Id. at 253.
Id. at 253-54.
168
Id. at 254.
169
Gresham, supra note 34, at 276.
170
Id. at 275.
171
Id. at 276.
172
See 795 Fifth Ave. Corp v. City of New York, 40 Misc. 2d 183, 191 (finding the
test for non-park use is “substantial satisfactions” to the general public); SFX
Entertainment, Inc. v. City of New York, 297 A.D.2d 555, 555 (1st. Dep’t 2002) (finding a
revocable license terminable at will cannot be a non-park purpose); Friends of Van
Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.S.2d 623, 631 (finding a non-park purpose
because of a 5-year long construction that inhibited use).
173
See Gallatin, 229 N.Y. at 254.
174
Id.
167
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entrance fee. Unfortunately, this type of analysis has guided courts after
Williams. Alternatively, this case could be analyzed as a violation of the
public trust doctrine because the Institute’s lease with the Park’s
Commission would have excluded the public from use of the Arsenal
Building two days a week and at nights.175 While the court did not explicitly
mention the exclusion in its analysis, it did include relevant allegations from
the petitioner’s complaint, including that the lease would hinder the
beneficial use by the public.176
Almost 45 years later the Court of Appeals again analyzed the public
trust doctrine in the context of parkland, and like in Williams it
concentrated its analysis on the type of facility being used for park
purposes.177 In 795 Fifth Ave. Corp v. City of New York, the Court of
Appeals held that a café-restaurant in the southeast corner of central park
was a valid exercise of the Park Commissioner’s discretionary power under
section 51 of the General Municipal Law.178 In 1959, the entrepreneur
Huntington Hartford and Robert Moses began talks about constructing a
“café operation”(“the café”) in Central Park.179 Mr. Huntington
subsequently donated a sufficient amount of money to construct the café in
the park.180 In 1960 the Commissioner of Parks formally accepted the
gift.181 The plaintiff brought an action claiming that this sort of structure in
the park was contrary to park purposes, alleging that the café operation
would replace 22,000 square feet of parkland with a two-story rectangular
glass building.182 He claimed that the structure would remove foot paths,
park benches, trees, and pave over existing lawn.183 Lastly, he claimed that
the restaurant would not be able to serve lower-income patrons who could
not afford to eat there.184
The County Supreme Court found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed,
that the claims were not proved at trial, and in fact the cafe would improve
175

Id. at 251.
Id.
177
795 Fifth Ave. Corp v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.2d 221, 225 (“Thus the case
comes down to the choice of location and type of facility.”).
178
Id. (finding that section 51 of the General Municipal Law gives the Park’s
Commissioner broad discretion in managing public parkland and judicial interference
should only be imposed when “a total lack of power” is demonstrated); New York City,
N.Y., Charter, 21 Department of Parks and Recreation § 553 (2013).
179
795 Fifth Ave. Corp, 15 N.Y. 2d at 224 (Robert Moses was the Park’s
Commissioner at the time and Huntington Hartford was a wealthy New Yorker).
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
795 Park Ave. Corp. v. City of New York, 40 Misc.2d 183, 184 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Cnty. 1963).
183
Id. at 184-85.
184
Id. at 185.
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park enjoyment, because the operation called for new footpaths, replaced
benches, and provided lighting for bridges and ponds.185 The court
explained, “[the] transformation of parklands from their natural state to
other park uses…does not involve a violation of park purposes. It merely
involves a change from one proper park use to another.”186 In its discussion
of non-park use, the court articulates a “test”, which asks whether the
proposed development “offers substantial satisfaction to the public.”187
The court further explained that when certain structures are placed in a
park they provide a different and glorified aspect to that structure and
therefore “offer substantial satisfaction to the public.”]189. 795 Park Ave.,
40 Misc.2d at 191.] For example, people may attend a production in a
traditional theater, but to see the same production in an open-air park theater
has its own benefits and provides satisfaction to the public.188 Likewise, a
restaurant inside a park provides a special atmosphere that “offers
substantial satisfaction” to the public.189 Although inserting structures in a
park can provide further enjoyment of the park, the court failed to consider
significantly whether the entire public could enjoy these structures if they
severely limit the accessibility of public parkland.190 The court failed to
adequately address the plaintiff’s claim that the café would be unaffordable
to many and assumed without justification that any user would be able to
receive the “substantial satisfaction” offered from a café in the park.191 This
begs the question of whose definition of substantial enjoyment the court
should consider.
Further, the logic used by the court to assess “substantial satisfaction”
makes little sense,192 under which, anything short of a government building
placed in a park will have an added benefit. A luxury apartment placed in a
public park will also provide substantial satisfaction to certain members of
the public, like a high-end restaurant, or a theater that charges substantial
rates to attend.193 Although, the court in 795 Fifth Ave, provides a more
185

Id. at 187, aff’d 795 Park Ave. v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.2d at 225 (1965).
Id. at 190.
187
Id. at 191. Although the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, it did not address
whether the “substantial enjoyment” test articulated is a proper or improper test to be used.
The Court of Appeals seemed to assume that a restaurant is a park purposes. See 795 Fifth
Ave. Corp. v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.2d 221, 225-26 (1965).
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 192 (describing testimony that from the architect of the pavilion that the
restaurant kitchen could be used for any class of people).
191
Id. (dismissing this complaint as speculative and advising to bring this complaint
when the violation is “actual”).
192
Id. at 191.
193
This Comment does not argue that an amphitheater that remains free or affordable,
or a restaurant that remains affordable should not be placed in a park. Rather it suggests
186
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concrete test for future courts to follow, courts must consider more
searchingly whether these developments offer “substantial” enjoyment to
all, without limiting lower-income people’s access.194
More recently, the court has applied the public trust doctrine in two
important cases, Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York and
SFX Entertainment v. City of New York. In Friends of Van Cortlandt Park
the Court of Appeals held that the construction of a water treatment plant
under Central Park, which would deprive the public of use of the area for
five years, required legislative approval.195 Here the court’s analysis turned
on the temporal deprivation of the parkland.196 The court found that the
finished project would not impede the public’s use of the park, but the
construction that would take at least 5 years to complete was a non-park
purpose and therefore required legislative approval.197 Here, the court’s
holding focused on access, and could be expanded by future courts to apply
to limitations on access based on the inability of some to afford the services.
The New York County Supreme Court in SFX Entertainment was the
first to comprehensively incorporate the affordability of the project into its
analysis, when it found that an amphitheater, which was not accessible to
the public and charged a $30 admission fee, did not serve a park purpose.198
However, the First Department overturned the County Supreme Court’s
ruling on this issue, and found that because the project was issued through a
license instead of a lease it did not violate the public trust
doctrine.199Although the First Department did not agree with the lower
court’s conclusion and put a greater emphasis on the contractual
arrangements, it did not completely overturn the lower court’s analysis.200
The First Department affirmed the lower court in so far as it was
permissible to open up the proposal process, and concentrated its analysis of
the public trust doctrine primarily on the contractual arrangements.201 This
leaves the court’s factorization of inaccessibility based on income a proper
that the court should analyze whether a project would have the effect to excluding or
limiting lower-income folks from use of the park, instead of dismissing the argument as
unripe for judicial review.
194
795 Park Ave. Corp. v. City of New York, 40 Misc. 2d 183, 191.
195
Friends of Van Cortlandt Park, 95 N.Y.2d at 631-32.
196
Id. at 631.
197
Id. at 631-32.
198
SFX Entertainment, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 50226(U), slip op. at 9
(N.Y.S.2d June 13, 2002).
199
SFX Entertainment, Inc. v. City of New York, 297 A.D.2d 555, 555 (1st Dep’t
2002) (holding that the concession agreement was inconsistent with the original proposal
and therefore appropriate to open the proposal process).
200
Id.
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factor for future courts to use.202
The important take away from these recent cases is that the courts are
acknowledging that income restrictions and accessibility should be part of
the analysis when determining valid park purposes and non-park
purposes.203 To conclude, the history of the public trust doctrine provides a
few major themes. First, it is clear that when parks are dedicated to the
municipality they remain in trust for the public purpose.204 Second, the park
cannot be alienated or used for a non-park purpose without approval of the
legislature.205 Third, the court’s analysis of park use and non-park use looks
at whether the proposed use furthers the recreational aspect of the park,206
whether it “offers substantial enjoyment”207, and whether temporally the
park would substantially prohibit the public’s use.208 Fourth, only one
overturned County Supreme Court articulated substantial interference with
park accessibility by reason of limiting use based on inaccessibility because
of income.209 For parks to remain protected and for the benefit of the public,
the court should follow the approach of the County Supreme Court in SFX
and provide an income means-sensitive analysis to determine if the purpose
actually serves the public.210
B. Competing Views of Public Trust Doctrine
Commentators differ on the efficiency of the public trust doctrine. As
noted, Gresham argues that the doctrine is insufficient because it lacks clear
definitions of what is and is not a park use.211 Gresham explains, “[the
courts’ definition of park uses] do not address the existing range of
contractual activities in parks. They have been ignored, creating bad
precedent and preexisting conflicting uses. Finally, they do not adequately
define what is and is not a park”.212 She critiques New York courts for
relying too heavily on the definition of park articulated in Williams,
claiming that park uses adapt and change over time and therefore the parks
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must, too.213 Gresham suggests that the common law doctrine could provide
more support if its definitions were more clearly stated and suggests that the
legislature could easily flesh out such definitions.214
Gresham does not discuss whether the courts should use income level
when analyzing non-park use, but she is clearly concerned with the move
towards privatization of parks.215 Gresham’s analysis assumes trust in the
state legislature to articulate guidelines that strengthen the common law
doctrine, which it very well may be able to.216 However, the state legislator
representing a region outside of the city may be too removed from the
concerns of municipal politics. The courts have more flexibility to consider
the circumstances of each specific case, and any legislation strengthening
the definitions of park/non-park purpose should be accompanied by a
modification by courts to look at accessibility of parkland through the lens
of an income means sensitive analysis.
Michael Seth Benn’s Note, Towards Environmental Entrepreneurship:
Restoring The Public Trust Doctrine in New York, argues for a reversion of
the public trust doctrine to the public use doctrine articulated in eminent
domain cases such as Morris and Kelo v. City of New London,217 theorizing
that this articulation would allow for free market environmentalism.218 Benn
also views the non-park/park use distinction as insufficient, because it lacks
clear definitions.219 However, Benn’s analysis seeks to formulate a clearer
definition in the form of, simply, whether the use would benefit the public
as formulated in Morris and Kelo.220 This definition would allow for more
entrepreneurship in the park, and would reject the park use/non park use
dichotomy, because it bars consideration of the best-valued use of the

213

Id. at 294 (“If New York courts are relying on Williams v. Gallatin as a definition
of park purposes, then only one view of park purposes is being used as a basis for
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See id. at 316.
217
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parkland.221
Benn’s analysis does not adequately consider the purpose of the public
trust doctrine, which is to limit private control of space for the public’s
interest.222 The public trust doctrine was originally established for the
purpose of preventing private owners from inhibiting the public’s use.223
The public trust doctrine is about the government exerting its police power
to preserve land for specific purposes, however, this is different than its
power to take “private property for public use.”224 Additionally, under Kelo,
“economic development” is a permitted public use for a takings, however,
entrepreneurship in parks can severely limit the public’s enjoyment of the
park, which is a fundamental principle of the public trust doctrine.225
Instead, the non-park/park use distinction should be defined more clearly
along the lines of keeping parks accessible to the entire public.
Lastly, in his practice report, Five Innovative Idea for Funding Parks
and Open Space, Christopher Rizzo, a practitioner with Carter Ledyard &
Milburn LLP, articulates the crisis facing public parks and provides advice
for moving toward more privatization of parks.226 Rizzo explains that parks
can employ different models, dedications, and functions to promote
commercial use in public parks.227 Rizzo’s analysis provides guidance to
these parks so that they remain well funded, and is not intended to focus on
the public’s access to parkland.228 He views commercial use and
private/public partnerships as the most effective way to maintain parks, and
argues that the better maintained the park, the better it is for the public.229
However, Rizzo does not take into consideration the fact that commercial
use risks limiting access to the parks on the basis of income and resources,
because private/public partnerships typically need to use parkland to raise
money for park maintenance, which entails hiring personnel, and other
necessary capital improvements to fit their idea of a park.230
The analysis developed in this Comment is most compatible with
Gresham’s approach. The public trust doctrine does not provide adequate
221
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protections to the public enjoyment and access to parkland, nor does it
provide adequate definitions so that courts can effectively limit the use of
parkland from non-park uses.231 This comment adds to Gresham’s analysis
that the test needs to include more attention to keeping parkland accessible
to the public, irrespective of means or income levels, and more
accountability to local politics in order to effectively provide these
protections. The following section will provide suggestions for maintaining
parks as open and accessible to all, including how the public trust doctrine
can better serve as a protection for all to enjoy public parks.
IV. WHAT CAN BE DONE TO PROTECT OUR PARKS
The first step to creating equity of parks access is to increase the Parks
Department’s budgets.232 Although the budget has increased over the past
few years with the 2013 fiscal year targeted increase at approximately 28
million,233 and advocates viewed the funding year 2015 preliminary budget
with optimism,234 the Parks Department is still inadequately funded.235 A
larger budget allows parks to make necessary improvements and properly
maintain parks, without relying on private funding or entrepreneurship in
parks.236 Parks can therefore plan for and permit amenities that are
accessible to all, because its focus can be on providing its services without
concerns about funding.237
In addition, the Court of Appeals must set a well-defined test for
231
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determining park/non-park purposes that incorporates general accessibility
of the public into its analysis of the public trust doctrine.238 This Comment
suggests a two-part test that is aligned with New York’s precedent. First,
courts should consider, as they have been, whether the proposed
development functions for the typical uses appropriate for that park.239
Under this step, the court should look at where the park is located, what
prior functions the park has served, and should also consider the multiple
and expanding functions of parks beyond the “pleasure ground” function
articulated in Williams.240 Second, the court should turn to whether the use
will provide substantial benefits to all New Yorkers’ use of the park.241
Under this part, the court should take a hard look at any proposed
agreement between the state and private venture to assure that the proposed
benefit will be accessible to all.242 This analysis should look at entrance fees
and times of operation for the entire public.243 Additionally, this analysis
should consider whether the park is adequately separated from residential
apartment buildings, because when residential apartment buildings are not
separated from parkland the park essentially becomes a “backyard” of sorts
for the residents, thereby excluding the public.244 The Court’s analysis must
also consider a new test in light of the expanding privatization of public
space, and the methods used to subvert the public trust doctrine.245 For
example, the court should not permit a General Project Plan to disregard the
original agreement.246
Further, there must be more deliberate democracy included in the
decision making process for park purposes.247 When a court concludes that
a venture is considered a non-park purpose, an arduous process is in place,
requiring a “home rule request”, and triggering the ULURP and SEQRA
processes.248 The ULURP protections are not required when a park purpose
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is present,249 and the SEQRA process may or may not be required.250
Therefore, situations such as GoogaMooga can take place without any
accountability to the community surrounding the park.251 A process of
deliberative democracy would allow for community members to deliberate
on whether a festival, or other venture where a revocable license is used,
would be something that they want in their park.252 Additionally, this type
of process would allow Park officials to explain and potentially justify the
necessity of having the proposed venture, thereby eliminating community
backlash afterwards. For example, there are some small projects that have
sought to create public spaces outside of the marketplace and have been
showcased in Spontaneous Interventions: Design Actions for the Common
Good.253
This Comment will conclude by making the connection to another
major issue facing parks today – the disparity of parks in affluent
neighborhoods compared to lower-income neighborhoods.254 The decrease
in the Parks Budget and the rise of conservancies and privatized models has
allowed parks in affluent neighborhoods to flourish and parks in lowerincome neighborhoods to deteriorate.255 The privatization of our parks has
contributed to this in two major ways. First, a privatized model, such as a
conservancy, allows for affluent areas to concentrate their wealth on
preserving the parks in their “backyards” without accounting for any
broader municipal structure.256 For example, Logan Paulson has been
scrutinized for his $100 million donation to Central Park in 2012.257 The
Conservancy model has worked for parks in affluent neighborhoods, but
when a neighborhood does not have ultra-wealthy individuals to donate for
249
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the maintenance of its parks then it suffers.
Second, parks in lower-income neighborhoods rely more on extravagant
development projects than ones in wealthier neighborhoods.258 For
example, a new megamall has recently been approved in Flushing Meadow
Park followed by a lawsuit claiming it violates the public trust doctrine.259
The best way to relieve these problems is with more public funding to
the Parks Department. A better-funded Park Department would eliminate
the “necessity” of privately funded parks and the issues that ensue. Daniel
Squadron, in his recently proposed bill has attempted to alleviate this
inequality by distributing 20 percent of private donations to parks in
affluent areas to parks in lower-income areas.260 This bill is a step in the
right direction and assists in promoting the well-being of parks in lowerincome neighborhoods. The bill, however is still a part of the city’s
increased reliance on social charity and does not solve the underlying
problems that come with the privatization of parks, such as limiting access
and disparities between parks in affluent neighborhoods and lower-income
ones.261
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